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TOURO LAW REVIEW
rationale of Codispoti when it recognized that a court "[n]eed not
look to the punishment actually imposed, [when the court is] able
to discern Congress' judgment of the character of the offense." 54
In sum, Foy's aggregate sentence approach failed. The basis
for the court's rationale was its analysis of the severity of the
offense. That severity is, in effect, determined by the Legislature
in its punishment classification. It is believed that those
prosecuted for "serious" offenses, i.e. greater than six months
imprisonment, have a greater exposition to the deprivation of
liberty and therefore, the inalienable guarantee deeply rooted in
both the Federal and State Constitutions is to provide for a trial
by jury. 55 It was along that line of reasoning that the court
firmly dismissed the allegation that the offenses were
consolidated solely for efficiency reasons. 56 The emphasis, the
Court explained, is on the examination of each offense
individually and separately and not an aggregation of the
sentences promulgated as petty offenses. 57 Therefore, in order
for a defendant to invoke the Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial, he or she must first have been charged with at least a single
offense that has been legislatively qualified as "serious."
People v. Knowles58
(decided October 22, 1996)
The defendant, Newton Knowles, claimed that his right to
counsel was violated under the Federal 59  and State
that a defendant has been charged with multiple counts of a petty offense
because the legislature has already determined the gravity and appropriate
punishment for that offense. Id.
54. Id. at 2168.
55. Foy, 88 N.Y.2d at 747, 673 N.E.2d at 593, 650 N.Y.S.2d at 83.
56. Id. at 747, 673 N.E.2d at 593, 650 N.Y.S.2d at 83.
57. Id. at 745, 673 N.E.2d at 591, 650 N.Y.S.2d at 81 (emphasis added).
58. 88 N.Y.2d 763, 673 N.E.2d 902, 650 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1996).
59. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial . . . and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense." Id.
[Vol 13
1
et al.: Jury Trial
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1997
JURY TRAL
Constitutions, 60 when his request for a second attorney was
denied by the trial court. 61 The Appellate Division, Second
Department, disapproved of the court's reasoning, but
nevertheless affirmed the conviction, finding that no
constitutional rights were violated. 62 The New York State Court
of Appeals, however, reversed their decision and ordered a new
trial.63
After a jury trial, Knowles was convicted of criminal
possession of a controlled substance. 64  The defendant was
assigned two attorneys, Robert Jones and Melody Glover, by The
Legal Aid Society. 65 The attorneys were designated to share
responsibilities during the trial.66 Prior to the start of the trial,
defense attorney Jones requested that attorney Glover cross-
examine the defendant's arresting officer. 67 The trial court,
however, denied the request stating that "Jones had appeared for
defendant at pretrial hearings without Glover's assistance, the
case was 'very simple and straightforward' and the Legal Aid
Society 'almost always [has] one attorney trying the case when
there is one defendant.' ' '68 The Appellate Division, Second
Department "strongly disapprove[d] of and [found] totally
unacceptable the trial court's reason for denying defense counsel
to assist him." 69 Despite the appellate division's disapproval of
the trial courts determination, the court affirmed the conviction
because Knowles' "constitutional rights were not impaired and
60. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. This section provides in pertinent part: "In
any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear
and defend in person and with counsel. ... " Id.
61. 88 N.Y.2d at 766, 673 N.E.2d at 904, 650 N.Y.S.2d at 619.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 765, 673 N.E.2d at 903, 650 N.Y.S.2d at 618.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 765, 673 N.E.2d at 904, 650 N.Y.S.2d at 619 (alterations in
original).
69. Id. at 766, 673 N.E.2d at 904, 650 N.Y.S.2d at 619 (alterations in
original).
1997]
2
Touro Law Review, Vol. 13 [1997], No. 3, Art. 34
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol13/iss3/34
TOURO LAW REVIEW
[he] was not prejudiced by the court's exclusion of Glover. ''70
The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and
ordered a new trial on the basis that Knowles' Sixth Amendment
rights were violated. 7 1  The court explained that. in denying
Knowles the assistance of co-counsel, the courts "interfered with
defense tactics in violation of defendant's right to the effective
assistance of counsel .... "72
In support of its holding, the majority relied primarily on New
York State cases, rather than on federal cases. 73 In People v.
Hall,74 the lawyer for the defendant was disqualified after he
admitted to having once represented the identification witness for
the prosecution and having previously been intimately involved
with a member of that witness' family. 75 Although it has been
established that courts have the authority "'to impose reasonable
rules to control the conduct of the trial,' 76 the Hall court
contended that "a court should be hesitant to interfere in an
established attorney-client relationship." 77 The court held that,
under these circumstances, the disqualification was proper
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id., at 768, 673 N.E.2d at 905, 650 N.Y.S.2d at 620. See People v.
Joseph, 84 N.Y.2d 995, 996, 998, 646 N.E.2d 807, 808-09, 622 N.Y.S.2d
505, 506-07 (1994) (holding that defendant who was prohibited from
discussing his testimony with his attorney during the weekend recess was
denied effective assistance of counsel). See also People v. Hillard, 73 N.Y.2d
584, 586-87, 540 N.E.2d 702, 702-03 542 N.Y.S.2d 507, 507, 508 (1989)
(holding that defendant who was prohibited from having contact with his
attorney for thirty days because of being found in contempt of court, was
denied effective assistance of counsel).
73. See People v. Joseph, 84 N.Y.2d 995, 646 N.E.2d 807, 622 N.Y.S.2d
505 (1994); People v. Hillard, 73 N.Y.2d 584, 540 N.E.2d 702, 542
N.Y.S.2d 507 (1989); People v. Arroyave, 49 N.Y.2d 264, 401 N.E.2d 393,
425 N.Y.S.2d 282 (1980); People v. Hall, 46 N.Y.2d 873', 387 N.E.2d 610,
414 N.Y.S.2d 678 (1979), cert. denied. 444 U.S. 848 (1979).
74. 46 N.Y.2d 873, 387 N.E.2d 610, 414 N.Y.S 2d 678 (1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 848 (1979).
75. Id. at 874, 387 N.E.2d at 610, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 678.
76. 88 N.Y.2d at 766, 673 N.E.2d at 904, 650 N.Y.S.2d at 618 (quoting
Hillard, 73 N.Y.2d at 586, 540 N.E.2d at 702, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 507).
77. Hall, 46 N.Y.2d at 875, 387 N.E.2d at 611, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 679.
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because the defendant was not deprived of his constitutional
rights. 78 In addition, the court argued that it was appropriate to
disqualify the attorney because "it appeared very likely that his
continuance in the case would work unfair prejudice either to the
prosecution or to the defendant." 79 The continued participation
by the attorney created a conflict of interest because of his prior
relationships with the prosecution's witness. 80
A conflict of interest and judicial efficiency are two factors in
determining whether it is proper to disqualify an attorney.
Knowles indicated that "judicial interference with an established
attorney-client relationship in the name of trial management may
be tolerable only where the court first determines that counsel's
participation presents a conflict of interest or where defense
tactics may compromise the orderly management of the trial or
the fair administration of justice." 81 However, this intervention
78. Id. at 874, 387 N.E.2d at 611, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 679.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 874, 387 N.E.2d at 611, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 679.
81. 88 N.Y.2d at 766-67, 673 N.E.2d at 904, 650 N.Y.S.2d at 619. See
People v. Arroyave, 49 N.Y.2d 264, 401 N.E.2d 393, 425 N.Y.S.2d 282
(1980). In Arroyave, the defendant wrote a letter to an attorney requesting his
assistance. Id. at 268, 401 N.E.2d at 395, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 284. The
defendant did not receive a response from the attorney until shortly before the
trial; it was held by the Department of Corrections. Id. When he did receive
the letter, he immediately responded, explaining the circumstances of his case
to the attorney. Id. The attorney applied for a delay in die trial in order to
prepare. Id. at 269, 401 N.E.2d at 395, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 285. That request
was denied and the defendant was represented by assigned counsel. Id. at 269,
401 N.E.2d at 396, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 285. The defendant was found guilty of
two counts of criminal sale of controlled substances in the first degree. Id. On
appeal, the court of appeals held that "[a]lthough a defendant has the
constitutionally guaranteed right to be defended by counsel of is own choosing,
this right is qualified in the sense that a defendant may not employ such right
as means to delay judicial proceedings." Id. at 271, 401 N.E.2d at 397, 425
N.Y.S.2d at 286. The court reasoned that
[t]he efficient administration of the criminal justice system is a critical
concern to society... and unnecessary adjournments for the purpose of
permitting a defendant to retain different counsel will disrupt dockets,
interfere with the right of other criminal defendants to a speedy trial,
and inconvenience witnesses, jurors and opposing counsel.
1997] 907
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should only be used sparingly, especially when an attorney-client
relationship develops that is predicated on trust. 82  The court
found that, under the circumstances, Glover's removal was
improper.83
The trial court asserted that there was no conflict of interest
present. 84 The primary concern of the trial court judge was that
the addition of Glover, a black woman, was a deliberate tactic by
the defense to evoke sympathy from members of the jury and that
her selection was not made in good faith. 85 The court of appeals
rejected that argument because of a lack of record support. 86
Additionally, the court did not find any reason to conclude that
the presence of Glover adversely impacted the efficiency of the
trial or the fair administration of justice. 87 Even if the presence
of multiple attorneys did cause a disruption, the court could only
impose reasonable restrictions "to ensure the fair and orderly
conduct of the proceedings." 88  According to the trial court,
Glover was "fully prepared to proceed with the cross-
examination . . . without delay." 89 The court argued that the
mere fact that Glover and the defendant were both black, did not
at all relate "to the efficient management of the trial." 90  In
addition, given the fact that the prosecutor was permitted to
82. 88 N.Y.2d at 767, 673 N.E.2d at 904, 650 N.Y.S.2d at 619.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 767, 673 N.E.2d at 905, 650 N.Y.S.2d at 620. The trial judge
stated that:
I will put on the record and be very frank, this defendant is black, you
are white, the other attorneys are white, Ms. Glover is black. I think
all you're doing is trying to put in some type of sympathy, to have a
very seasoned appearance. I think you're trying to gain some undue
advantage and I will not permit that. I think your application is made in
bad faith.
Id. at 766, 673 N.E.2d at 904, 650 N.Y.S.2d at 619.
86. Id. at 767, 673 N.E.2d at 905, 650 N.Y.S.2d at 620.
87. Id. at 768, 673 N.E.2d at 905, 650 N.Y.S.2d at 620.
88. Id. at 767, 673 N.E.2d at 904, 650 N.Y.S.2d at 619. The court
indicated, however, that this discretion should be used sparingly. particularly
when the defendant has developed a trust from his or her attorneys. Id.
89. Id., 673 N.E.2d at 905, 650 N.Y.S.2d at 620.
90. Id. at 768, 673 N.E.2d at 905, 650 N.Y.S.2d at 620.
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obtain assistance for the trial, "no legitimate claim can be made
that Glover's presence at the defense table would have impaired
the efficient conduct of the trial. " 9 1 The addition of Glover
would not have "disrupted the efficient conduct of the trial or
resulted in prejudice . . ."92 The court also acknowledged that
it is a matter of routine practice to have more than one attorney
representing a client. 93  It was a strategy utilized by Jones
"because 'two heads are better than one' and because the dual
representation would be 'mutually rewarding' to both
attorneys."9 4 Therefore, the trial court was found to have acted
arbitrarily and to have abused its discretion. 95
The dissent's primary contention is that Knowles'
constitutional rights were not violated because he never claimed
that "he received ineffective assistance of counsel or that he did
not receive a fair trial . . "96 Therefore, although the court
erred in disqualifying Glover, the error was harmless because it
did not violate the constitution and Knowles was not prejudiced
by the courts ruling. 97 Thus, the court did not deprive Knowles
of counsel, nor was his counsel ineffective. 98 He did not receive
ineffective representation merely because he was limited to one
attorney; an indigent defendant is not constitutionally entitled to
two attorneys. 99 Therefore, the dissent argued that he received
a fair trial. 100
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 767, 673 N.E.2d at 904, 650 N.Y.S.2d at 619.
94. Id. at 775, 673 N.E.2d at 909, 650 N.Y.S.2d at 624 (Simons, J.,
dissenting).
95. Id. at 768, 673 N.E.2d at 905, 650 N.Y.S.2d at 620.
96. Id. at 773, 673 N.E.2d at 908, 650 N.Y.S.2d at 623 (Simons, J.
dissenting).
97. Id. at 774, 673 N.E.2d at 909, 650 N.Y.S.2d at 624 (Simons, J.
dissenting). Simons further opined that "the judge's conduct constituted trial
error, not constitutional error, and it is subject to harmless error analysis." Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 773, 673 N.E.2d at 908, 650 N.Y.S.2d at 623 (Simons, 1.
dissenting). The Supreme Court has never actually reviewed this issue. See
Bell v. Watkins, 692 F.2d 999, 1009 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
843 (1983) (stating that "[a]lthough Mississippi courts may customarily appoint
two lawyers in a capital case, the Constitution dictates no such requirement):
1997] 909
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The majority in Knowles adhered to United States
Supreme Court's analysis of the Sixth Amendment. In Gideon v.
Wainwright,10 1  the Supreme Court held that the Sixth
Amendment extends to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment so that indigent defendants, being prosecuted in state
court, have the right to have counsel appointed for them. 102
In Wheat v. United States, 10 3 the defendant was charged
with conspiracy to possess marijuana. 104 One of the defendant's
co-conspirators decided to plead guilty. 105 At the conclusion of
the plea proceedings, the co-conspirator's attorney was contacted
by the defendant to try his case. 106 The district court objected,
fearing potential conflicts of interest.107 The conflict they
primarily feared was that the attorney would be representing the
defendant and the co-conspirator simultaneously, and there was a
likelihood that the co-conspirator would be called to testify by the
Government against the defendant. 108 Such events would have
been problematic since it is ethically forbidden for an attorney to
Crum v. Hunter, 151 F.2d 359, 361 (10th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S.
850 (1946) (stating that a defendant does not have a constitutional right to more
than one attorney unless it is essential for his defense).
100. Knowles, 88 N.Y.2d at 776, 673 N.E.2d at 910, 650 N.Y.S.2d at 625
(Simons, J. dissenting).
101. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). In Gideon, the defendant was charged with a
felony. Id. at 336. Upon appearing in a Florida state court without money or
a lawyer, Gideon made a request to have a lawyer appointed to represent him.
Id. at 337. However, the court denied his request because they held that
lawyers can only be appointed in capital offense cases. Id. Thus, he
conducted his entire defense by himself. Id. The jury found him guilty and he
was sentenced to five years in state prison. Id. His petition for habeas corpus
was denied by the Florida Supreme Court. Id. However, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that the Sixth Amendment extends
to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 338, 342.
102. Id. at 342, 344-45. Justice Sutherland noted that "[tihe right to be heard
would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be
heard by counsel." (quoting Powell v. Alabama 287 U.S. 45 (1932)).
103. 486 U.S. 153 (1988).
104. Id. at 154.
105. Id. at 155.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 157.
108. Id.
910 [Vol 13
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cross-examine his client, and additionally, because it would
provide the defendant with ineffective assistance of counsel. 109
The defendant appealed, asserting that his Sixth Amendment
rights were violated. 110
The Supreme Court, however, affirmed the decision of
the district court and reasoned that "when a trial court finds an
actual conflict which impairs the ability of a criminal defendant's
chosen counsel to conform with the ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility, the court should not be required to tolerate an
inadequate representation of a defendant."Il The Court
continued by stating that the purpose of the Sixth Amendment "is
to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant
rather than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be
represented by the lawyer he prefers."112 Those guarantees are
meant to "insure that those charged with [a] crime are
represented by an effective advocate and thus ensure that they
receive a fair trial. " 113 The State can violate that right to
effective assistance "when it interferes . . . with the ability of
counsel to make independent decisions about how to conduct the
defense." 114
Therefore, it is clear that both New York and the Supreme Court
have the same objectives. Both consider whether the additional
attorney would present a conflict of interest and whether it would
adversely impact the efficiency of the trial. The ultimate purpose
109. Id.
110. Id. at 157-58.
111. Id. at 162 (quoting United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177. 1184 (3d
Cir. 1978)).
112. Id. at 159.
113. Knowles, 88 N.Y.2d at 772, 673 N.E.2d at 908, 650 N.Y.S.2d at 623
(Simons, J. dissenting) (citing Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159; Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984); United States v. Cronic. 466 U.S.
648, 658 (1984)).
114. Strickland, 466 U.S at 686. See, e.g., Geders v. United States, 425
U.S. 80 (1976) (noting that barring an attorney the right to client consultation
during overnight recess violates the right to effective assistance); Herring v.
New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975) (noting that barring summation at a bench
trial violates the right to effective assistance).
19971
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of the Sixth Amendment of both the Federal and New York
Constitutions is to insure that there is a fair trial.
People v. Pagel 15
(decided April 2, 1996)
Defendant Kenneth Page moved to set aside his convictions for
grand larceny and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. 116 He
based his motion on the fact that an alternate juror had, without his
written consent, been substituted for a regular juror subsequent to
the beginning of deliberations. 117 Page argued that, unlike the
Sixth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, 118 the New York
State Constitution 119 guarantees criminal defendants the right to a
jury of twelve persons. 120 Thus, when the alternate juror was
115. 88 N.Y.2d 1, 665 N.E.2d 1041, 643 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1996).
116. Id. at 4, 665 N.E.2d at 1042, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 2.
117. Id. at 4, 665 N.E.2d at 1042-43, 643 N.Y.S. 2d at 2-3.
118. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed .... " Id.
119. N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 2. This section provides:
Trial by jury in all cases in which it has heretofore been guaranteed by
constitutional provision shall remain inviolate forever; but a jury trial
may be waived by the parties in all civil cases in the manner to
prescribed by law. The legislature may provide, however, by law, that
a verdict may be rendered by not less than five-sixths of the jury in any
civil case. A jury trial may be waived by the defendant in all criminal
cases, except those in which the crime charged may be punishable by
death, by a written instrument signed by the defendant in person in open
court before and with the approval of a judge or justice of a court
having jurisdiction to try the offense. The legislature may enact laws,
not inconsistent herewith, governing the form, content, manner and time
of presentation of the instrument effectuating such waiver.
Id.
120. Page, 88 N.Y.2d at 3, 665 N.E.2d at 1042, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 2.
Though Article I, § 2 of the New York State Constitution does not specifically
grant a constitutional right to twelve jurors in a criminal trial, New York
courts take the view that a right to twelve jurors is a fundamental right based
912 [Vol 13
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